bureaucrats and military leaders whose power had grown during the authoritarian regime over the last three decades. Because Kim Dae Jung barely won the presidential election over Lee Hoi Chang, Kim's political basis was extremely shaky.
2 Conservative social and political forces, which represented the majority of voters, did not fully succumb to the reality of their political defeat. Thus, discursive politics became the most immediate and powerful battleground on which a winner might signi® cantly affect the future direction of the political game.
The discursive politics included displacement, articulation and rearrangement of the universe of discursive resources developed along the lines of political ideologies. I argue that it is an extension of past ideological and political con¯icts based on both political realignment and ideology of regionalism in South Korea. In the past, since most political parties were controlled by a small number of political leaders, political realignment among these parties occurred frequently according to political deals between their leaders.
3 Political leaders have strong supporters who were segregated across the region. The identi® cation of political leaders with certain regions was developed because Park Jung Hee had exclusively appointed people from his own native region to key positions in government, military and business during the 1960s and 1970s. Military personnel, government bureaucrats and politicians from Youngnam region formed a ruling bloc, excluding people from other regions, especially the Cholla region. Strong support from the Youngnam region was crucial for the military regime, which suffered a from lack of political legitimacy. Regionalism became a major axis for party formation and political mobilization instead of class and political ideology. Political leaders continuously interpolated regional identity to voters during consecutive elections. Intertwined with existing political splits, the discourse on the crisis concerning the analysis of the crisis and policy measures to resolve it has shifted from a pure economic discourse to a political one. As the economic crisis became an ordinary subject of discourse, discourses of the crisis became realigned with the political dynamics that were framed in the context of regionalism in South Korea.
The conservative opposition party managed to ® nd its way to opposition against the new ruling party that unions in Youngnam province, a regional political basis of the military regime, joined the rally organized by the conservative opposition party in December 1998 displayed realignment of the political discourse and articulation of the crisis discourse with regionalism. The discourses of the crisis associated with regionalism showed that discourse was a mode of political action representing ± as well as transforming ± social relations and social structure by constituting the world in a meaningful system.
The crisis of discourse in the present day reveals that the dominant ideologies established by the authoritarian state and chaebols have begun to weaken rapidly but the counter or alternative ideologies have not gained popularity among the people yet. Furthermore, regressive authoritarian populism based on the authoritarian political party and the ideology of regionalism was developed during the economic crisis, thus deepening the crisis of discourse. The crisis of discourse strongly demands the formation of a new hegemonic discourse speci® c to the Korean experience during the economic crisis. Needless to say, the construction of a new discourse should involve the current economic situation as well as the contentious politics in South Korea.
Discourses of the crisis
The term`crisis' has been heavily charged with political meanings in South Korea. The authoritarian state, business organizations, labour unions and dissident movement organizations frequently used the term to serve their own purposes. At the beginning of every year during the 1970s and 1980s, the military government always mentioned the year as`a year of crisis.' The military government used the term`crisis' to prevent possible mass protest by invoking a sense of impending danger. For example, threats from North Korea and economic hardship due to increasing international competitiveness were frequently mentioned at the beginning of new years. The state wanted to invoke a`crisis mentality' among people, which was intended to discourage or discredit the labour movement or the pro-democracy movement organized by university students and opposition parties, by labelling them as non-patriotic.
The effects of the state's statement of the crisis have been nulli® ed since too frequent a mention of the crisis situation eventually diminished its impact on people's perception of`the national crisis.' People were becoming insensitive to the crisis statement advocated by the authoritarian government. Even though the conservative mass media controlled by the government quoted the state's report of the crisis situation and propagated it all over the nation, this kind of concerted effort from the state and mass media were not as successful in the 1980s. Because the mass media themselves were not regarded as reliable sources of information, alternative sources of information ± such as underground newspapers and private information ± began to be more effective in shaping people's perception of political reality in the 1980s and in the early 1990s.
State and businesses continued to use the term`crisis' in the 1990s because political contention became more visible and the labour movement was intensi® ed due to the collapse of the authoritarian regime. However, the reality of the economic condition in the early 1990s was far from becoming a crisis situation. Although there was an increasing trade de® cit and manufacturing production was slowing down, it could not be called a crisis at all. Nevertheless, the state announced the coming of a crisis situation in the Korean economy even when the economy displayed a high economic growth rate of 6± 8 percent a year. The main purpose of this announcement was to dissuade social protests and pre-empt possible militant labour movements. It was not intended to change workers' consciousness. Rather, its aim was to isolate militant workers from ordinary workers and citizens, and to blame the labour movement for the bad performance of the national economy. Because there were industrial disputes in the spring when collective bargaining began, as they did in Japan, the state used to announce an imminent economic crisis in January each year.
In fact, the social groups being damaged the most were small and medium size ® rms in the manufacturing sector because the slowdown of the economy affected them most severely. While other industrial sectors were not in serious trouble, the number of bankruptcies increased sharply in the manufacturing sector. Thus, small capitalists felt the effect of a changing economy more seriously than before. They experienced economic hardship due to economic recession in the US and Japan. Nevertheless, compared with other economies in the West, the Korean economy, in general, displayed a superb performance in the early 1990s.
Ever since President Kim Young Sam began using`internationalization' (Kookjehwa) in November 1993 as a policy guideline, the positive and offensive (i.e. aggressive) meaning of`internationalization' has replaced the negative and defensive meaning of`crisis'. In April 1994, the Korean government joined the Uruguay Round (UR) which replaced the General Agreement of Trade and Tax (GATT). As the international economic environment changed, the government took a more active strategy to respond to it. Abandoning the reform drive started in the ® rst half of 1993, President Kim Young Sam announced that internationalization was a goal to be achieved by the collective efforts of all kinds of actors, including politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, workers and citizens. Because the state has been the most powerful actor in shaping modern Korean society, it produced the new slogaǹ internationalization' and made it a policy goal. It was rarely used as a concept to describe the postwar international relations in South Korea's academic circles until Kim propagated it. Therefore, the term`internationalization' became a part of political rhetoric or propaganda since it was adapted to transform the dominant discourse among the people.
Sometimes a new policy orientation was announced to replace the existing discourse by another one. When the state became the target of criticism, a new political slogan was publicized to override or marginalize that criticism. As the government switched its policy from`reform' to`internationalization,' the mass media took up that term and made it the source of popular discourse. The state frequently used this replacement strategy to change the concerns and interests of the people.
Instead of internationalization, Kim Young Sam introduced`globalization' (Sekeoyhwa) as a new policy principle, as if Korea had indeed become a real member of a global society since 1994. On the one hand, the term`globalization' was used to express the national pride of successful economic growth. Kim Young Sam used globalization' as political rhetoric to say that Korea has now become a nation mature enough to talk about the global economy and global culture beyond national territory. It was not used as a descriptive term or scienti® c concept to explain a social process in a global scale, such as the increasing economic interdependence or changing relationship among the states. On the other hand, however, it was presented as a guideline for state policy, that is`to advance into the world.' The concept of globalization was not frequently mentioned before President Kim used the word Sekeoyhwa. With the help of the mass media, Kim Young Sam succeeded, politically, in making globalization a keyword in popular discourse.
However, nobody clearly understood what Sekeoyhwa (globalization) really meant; therefore, globalization was interpreted differently according to one's economic interest. For example, major newspapers began to report famous resort areas in foreign countries and TV programmes televised foreign experiences. When a new section was needed, newspaper corporations competed to expand the number of pages to include foreign cultures and events. Prior to 1994, a page increase in newspapers was criticized and discouraged because pulp used for newspaper production was imported. Travel agencies took up globalization to promote overseas travel. Travelling abroad became a fashion among middle class and university students. Before the military government lifted the ban on free travel in the early 1980s, only privileged people could travel abroad. Then, only a small number of people could go abroad owing to the limitation of economic resources. In 1991, the number of Koreans travelling abroad was 1,856,000. However, it jumped sharply to 4,649,000, a 250 percent increase, in 1996 (http://www.mct.go.kr/ns data f.html). English learning study tours also became a trend among elementary school students as well as university students. As the bubble economy continued for a while, Kimpo International Airport was packed with Korean travellers. South Korea was engulfed by a gale of globalization.
On the other hand, globalization as used by academics and politicians re¯ected aggressive nationalism that would go beyond the economic achievement in the past. It seemed to be similar to`social Darwinism', which was developed in the late 19th century in Europe to justify the imperialist expansion of the European nations (Hawkins 1997; Himmelfarb 1996: 412± 431) . However, globalization advocated by the state was mainly oriented towards`economic Darwinism', in which the expansion of export to other countries was considered a patriotic act and Korean products should dominate in the international market. The mentality behind globalization was`the struggle for survival of Korea' and`the survival of the ® ttest commodity' in the international market rather than coexistence and sharing. The image of the market shaped by the government was a ® eld characterized by struggle and domination. The government echoed the business sector and claimed that winning in the international market was a prerequisite for the survival of a Korea without natural resources.
The Korean government tried to af® rm the fact that Korea has become a member of the international community by joining the OECD. The government ® nally celebrated Korea's membership of the OECD in 1996. President Kim Young Sam con® rmed the per capita GNP has exceeded ten thousand US dollars and that Korea has become`a member of the rich country club' during his term of of® ce. Koreans enjoyed their pride of being a member of the OECD. The membership of the OECD was propagated as a symbol of achievement for the globalization policy of the Kim Young Sam regime.
Ironically, the real economic crisis suddenly emerged when nobody talked about the crisis situation and celebrated their club membership of the rich countries. Although Southeast Asian nations were plagued by ® nancial crisis during the second half of 1997, major economic actors, including state of® cials and chaebols, never expected the sudden collapse of the Korean economy. Politicians and bureaucrats were mostly interested in the upcoming presidential election in December 1997. Economists warned of a possible ® nancial crisis, but state of® cials considered those warnings impertinent to the Korean economy. The acceptance of the IMF bailout programme in December 1997 was a shock for those who were talking about globalization as the next step of Korean development. Korean society was too distracted by the ® erce electoral competition for a new president ± a political drama relayed by the major mass media.
The internal logic behind of the economic crisis was a simple one: the shortage of US dollars in Korea. The shortage of foreign currency resulted in the bankruptcy of the Korean economy as a whole. Because of the shortage of foreign currency, many companies and ® rms could not repay their loans from foreign banks and ® nancial institutions. Chaebols, the Korean word meaning conglomerates owned by small number of families, had been too dependent on foreign loans. When the state announced that it would not support mismanaged chaebols' companies, foreign investors started to pull their investment out of Korea. The inconsistency of the state's economic policy caused an instability on the ® nancial market and triggered an exodus of foreign capital in a short period of time, creating a ® nancial catastrophe in South Korea. The sudden collapse of the Korean economy drove massive numbers of workers out of employment. One and half million workers lost their jobs in the ® rst six months of 1998. It also uprooted the white-collar middle class in urban areas, which has expanded during the period of steady economic growth. Some ridiculed Kim Young Sam's globalization policy, saying that Korea had really gone global under his leadership, since the IMF, a global ® nancial organization, could now govern Korea's economy.
The foreign currency exchange crisis transformed the whole intellectual discourse from aggressive economic nationalism, based on national pride and, sometimes, nationalist sentiment, to pessimistic collective remorse. The sudden collapse of the Korean economy resulted in total panic since state managers, including the president, did not understand clearly what went wrong. The state has played a role as an omnipotent political and economic actor in manufacturing economic plans and in implementing them in a coercive manner for the last three decades. However, people were haunted by a feeling of helplessness when they found that the state was no longer a capable and reliable actor. It seemed that nobody knew why it had happened or how it could be resolved. While the currency exchange rate on the US Dollar soared to almost 200 percent, the Bank of Korea could not do anything to control it. All measures were exhausted. The Korean economy faced a foreign currency crisis.
The discourses of the crisis that were carried out by mass media were bound in the national territory and locally. Because the mass media in Korea has shown strong parochialism in their organization and management style, they could not properly deal with the economic crisis associated with an international economy. The economic crisis revealed how deeply the Korean economy is intertwined with the global economy. It undermined two conventional assumptions. First, there was an assumption that the Korean economy could be fully controlled by the state bureaucrats who manufactured economic growth. Therefore, the state was solely responsible for the status of the national economy. Secondly, there was another assumption that the Korean bourgeoisie wanted the state's neo-liberal economic policy. For owners of chaebols, neo-liberalism was considered the reduction of state regulation on economy and the privatization of public corporations. They demanded deregulation and privatization of the public corporations. They raised their voice to demand a neoliberal economic policy as if they advocated and represented a neo-liberal economic ideology.
As the global economy began to take shape, the Korean economy was no longer free from external economic in¯uences. The national economy was not only signi® cantly affected by foreign trade but also by foreign capital investment. The Korean economy had already been internationalized and was connected to the global economy before the state proclaimed Kukjehwa (internationalization) and Sekeoyhwa (globalization). The state could not ® nd an appropriate policy leverage to change the national economy since the foreign economic actors were beyond the state's control. The strong state revealed its weakness and inability to govern the market and economy, when globalization ± a policy goal set by the state itself ± became reality.
When the IMF, the quintessential organization of a neo-liberal economic ideology, demanded the reform of the chaebol system, it annoyed citizens as well as the owners of chaebols who advocated a neo-liberal economic ideology. Neo-liberalism advocated by chaebols became a target of a neo-liberal economic reform imposed by the IMF. While chaebols demanded an overhaul of the state regulation, the IMF imposed an overhaul of the dominance by chaebols in the ® nancial market, which contributed to the inef® cient distribution of ® nancial resources. Because chaebols were blamed for the economic crisis, the chaebols system should be included in the list of reforms. Ironically, the state regained economic power to control chaebols by virtue of the IMF reform. The IMF demanded the Korean government carry out a comprehensive economic reform that included the restructuring of ownership structure and management system of chaebols' companies. The neo-liberal IMF empowered the state with a strong authoritarian tradition to reconstruct the ® nancial system and the Korean economy that had been controlled by the small number of chaebols.
The crisis of discourses
When the Korean economy was experiencing this unprecedented crisis, discourses on the causes and consequences of the crisis appeared from various social groups with various interpretations. The discourse of the crisis had been developed mainly among politicians, academic circles and social movement organizations. On the political level, the contending political parties provided their own interpretations of the crisis and the policy measures to manage it. Various discourses of the crisis reveal different political ideologies. However, heavily tainted political discourse obscured the causes of the economic crisis that affected people's everyday life. In addition, a lack of appropriate knowledge of the economic system operating at national and international level contributed to`the collective ignorance' of the crisis among politicians.
The ruling party at that time suggested that it was key governmental of® cials who made policy mistakes in responding to the foreign currency turmoil, which was worsening due to the ® nancial crisis in Southeast Asia. It was blamed on personal inability or the mistakes of the ministers or presidential economic assistants. The opposition party attacked both the ruling party and President Kim Young Sam for their inability to deal with, and the ignorance of, the economic reality. Kim Young Sam and his cabinet members were accused of concealing the economic reality and manipulating foreign currency exchange rates to increase Korea's per capita GNP to over US$10,000. Because Kim Young Sam tried to show that per capita GNP exceeded US$10,000 during his term of of® ce, the government stuck to the policy of maintaining a high value of Korean won against the US dollar.
As soon as the opposition party won the presidential election, it tried to get enough foreign currency from foreign banks as well as from the IMF. Therefore, president elect Kim Dae Jung invited Michael Jackson, the popular singer, and George Soros, owner of one of the biggest Hedge Funds, to help with this effort. Unlike President Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung and his associates seemed to be willing to take responsibility for managing the ® nancial crisis and they tried desperately to attract foreign investment to increase foreign exchange holdings. The new ruling party also criticized the previous ruling party for adopting the political logic that distorted the currency market and downgraded the nation's credit rating, because it lost foreign investors' con® dence when it dealt with the cases of Hanbo Steel Company and Kia Motor Company. Hanbo Steel Company, the major company of Hanbo Groups, the 16th largest chaebol, constructed a new iron manufacturing factory with loans from both domestic banks and foreign banks. The bankruptcy of Hanbo Steel Company had the potential to damage the already unstable economy. Because the second son of the president was involved in the business of Hanbo Steel Company, the government did not let it go bankrupt immediately. While the government was taking several months to decide whether to let it go bankrupt or not, the major banks that lent a colossal amount of money to Hanbo Steel could not escape the fate of their own bankruptcy due to the mass bank withdrawal by their clients. 4 Furthermore, KIA Motor Company, the eighth largest company in South Korea, also suffered from the loss and could not repay its debts. It took a few more months to ® nd a solution, which was to let Hyudai buy out the KIA Motor Company with help from the state. In spite of the de facto bankruptcy of both companies, the state could not decide how to deal with these companies because they were so big. Any decision would affect the national economy. Incompetence on the state's part to solve the bankruptcy crisis of big chaebols disturbed the stability of the economy and accelerated the breakdown of the ® nancial system that was resulting from the bankruptcy of major banks. The subsequent bankruptcy of several banks resulted in the collapse of the Korean economy as a whole because they banks could not repay foreign debt.
The discourse of the crisis has been well developed in Korean academic circles, including private and public research institutes and universities. There are four types of crisis discourse in academia: conservative, liberalist, nationalist and Marxist. Although they share the view that Korean capitalism is a crony capitalism, with corruption and favouritism, each has a different emphasis on different causes and strategies for the crisis management. First, the conservative discourse understands that the current economic crisis is a product of the failure of the state's policy rather than a structural weakness of the economy. This is the conservative view because the current economic system is not being questioned at all. The conservative discourse is articulated by chaebols and some bureaucrats (Chung 1998: 174) . The discourse is not well developed as an independent and systematic one. However, some politicians and government of® cials share this view and use it to criticize the ruling bloc. For example, the public prosecutor's of® ce demonstrated this type of conservative discourse when it tried to ® nd someone to blame for the foreign currency exchange crisis. It arrested two people who were supposed to be responsible for the crisis ± the former deputy premier± economic planning minister and a former economic assistant to the president in the Kim Young Sam regime. This discourse does not have any vision and hope for the future. It simply re¯ects a power shift from Kim Young Sam to Kim Dae Jung. Ironically, the public prosecutor's of® ce once served as an oppressive apparatus for the authoritarian regime and now tries to show its loyalty to the newly elected president who was once a victim of authoritarian rule.
Secondly, the liberalist discourse developed among mainstream economists and rapidly spread among ordinary people (Booz, Allen & Hamilton 1997; McKinsey Global Institute 1998; Chung 1998) . The liberalist discourse focuses on the moral hazard of the chaebols and the failure of institutionalization of the global standard. Liberalist discourse has been well represented by mass media and economists, condemning the overuse of ® nancial resources by chaebols under the collusion of the state. It also argues that the crisis came from the failure of the institutionalization of the global standard in management, both in the private sector and the public sector. The major task suggested by the liberalist discourse is to upgrade the Korean economic system by introducing Western-style accounting practices and terminating the cross payment guarantee system. It will, in principle, enhance the transparency of Korean enterprises. In practice it means the de facto breakdown of the chaebol system. The IMF is perceived by the liberalists as a progressive agency for the reform of the chaebols system. This attempt was unsuccessful even though the reform was supposed to be carried out by the strong state in the former half of the Kim Young Sam regime. The IMF version of the crisis is the neo-liberalist one that assumes the role of a free market as the rationalizing force, monitoring and allocating resources. The market includes the ® nancial market, product market and labour market. Therefore, enhancing the market function is considered the most urgent task for the state to achieve. The most important feature of the liberalist discourse on the crisis is that chaebols are considered the culprit of the IMF crisis. While those who criticize chaebols were accused of being anti-capitalist radicals in the past, they are now accepted as rational economists. The liberalist discourse clearly offers an agenda to dismantle the crumbling infrastructure of crony capitalism originated by Park Jung Hee.
Thirdly, nationalist discourses have also been developed among conservative nationalists as well as radical camps, such as the leaders of the new labour unions. These are based on conspiracy theories that suggest the Korean economic crisis is an intended consequence, plotted by foreign nations or international ® nancial groups. For example, some argue that the US tries to destabilize the Asian economy to prevent it from becoming the most powerful economy in the world (Lee 1998; Kim 1998). Others express that`the IMF demands are nothing more than efforts to protect foreign investors at the expense of Korean' (Korea Times, 18 January 1998). Representatives of the Federation of Korean Industries, an economic association controlled by chaebols, defended the chaebol system as traditional economic organizations, arguing that the economic reform demanded by the IMF was a conspiracy of the advanced countries (Hankyeoreh 21, 18 December 1997). Nationalist discourses provoke strong hostility toward IMF intervention in the national economy. Because the IMF is supposed to be controlled by the US, the nationalists think the IMF is working to restructure the Korean economy as well as the Asian economy only for the purpose of ® tting them into the US economic hegemony. International hedge funds created the economic crisis so that it would be easier for them to acquire ® rms at lower costs. Nationalist discourse stresses the attempt of the US to maintain its world economic hegemony or seek short-term pro® t for its international ® nancial capital.
Finally, Marxist discourses, which are shared by some leaders of the Korean Federation of Trade Unions and old leftists, emphasize that Korean ® nancial crisis is a part of the global economic crisis (Chung 1998) . The Korean economic crisis is a part of the global crisis of capitalism. Although there might be some variations of the effect of the global crisis, all economies are experiencing serious economic recession. The spread of ® nancial crises from Southeast Asia through East Asia to Brazil and Russia reveals the crisis of industrial capitalism as a mode of production. It implies that the economic crisis was inevitable rather than avoidable. Variants of Marxist discourses (cf. dependency theories and world system theories) reappeared in 1998, but they have not become popular among public discourse yet because they could not provide any way to overcome the immediate economic crisis (cf. Lim 1999) . Although Marxist discourse is popular among radical intellectuals, it has failed to become a master code of popular discourse on the economic crisis. It does not suggest any practical and immediate measure for the economic recovery and instability of unemployment.
Discourses on the economic crisis have developed since December 1997. While they tried to explain the structural problems of the Korean economy, they failed to explain economic growth. Why did the Korean economy continue to grow in the last three decades and then suddenly collapse? On the one hand, discourses of the Korean miracle (cf. Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Haggard 1990) did not expect such a sudden collapse of Korean economy at all. For example, Amsden, who praised Korea as`the next giant,' could only ® nd external factors to explain the Korean economic crisis, by arguing that`the Asian crisis was triggered by foreign political as well as economic forces' (Amsden and Hikino 1998: 43) . Amsden and Hikino (1998) argued that the ® nancial liberalization that caused the ® nancial crisis in Korea was determined by the US government in order to reduce trade de® cit with Korea and to expand capital gain in the Korean ® nancial market. On the other hand, those who asserted`Asian values' or`Confucian capitalism' partly re¯ected the national pride of economic success but could not explain either the sudden death of the Korean economy or the malaise of the Japanese economy (Tu 1996; Lew 1999) . Therefore, the discourse on Asian values was abruptly replaced by the discourse on global standards or global values. The mass media began to circulate`the global standard' in administration and business activity. For example, Dong-A Ilbo (Dong-A Daily Newspaper), one of the largest newspapers, began to issue a series of special sections on the global standard, which was a critique of Asian business ethics and management style. Most discourses focusing on the collapse of the Korean economy could not explain why it expanded so rapidly for the last three decades. Thus, the crisis of the Korean economy produced a crisis of discourse on East Asia as well as on Korea. The Korean economic crisis revealed the frailty of the current social science as well as the powerlessness of the state.
The most serious problem of the discourse on the crisis is that there has been no social and political consensus on the policy measure to solve the crisis. The government tried to follow the prescription given by the IMF, but it did not work as a hegemonic discourse as millions of workers suffered from unemployment and poverty. Private consulting ® rms such as McKinsey Global Institute (1998) or Booz, Allen & Hamilton (1998) , instead of the state and academics, carried out a comprehensive diagnosis of the Korean economy and suggested a blueprint for economic reform. Their analysis and suggestions were biased in favour of the neo-liberalist assumption of the market and international economy. Trade unions and social movement organizations did not regard reports of the private consulting ® rms desirable and reliable. The discourse of the crisis failed to produce a hegemonic discourse and so generated the crisis of discourse on the crisis.
The politics of crisis management and the politics of regionalism
The economic crisis occurred during the period of a dramatic shift of political power from the ruling Grand Nation Party (GNP) to the opposition People's Congress for the New Politics (PCNP). Therefore, the politics of crisis management were intertwined with the politics of regime change in 1998. Independent of the discourses of the crisis among academics and in the business world, public discourse was developing along the line of regional splits. The GNP has a strong electoral basis in Youngnam region in the southeastern peninsula, while the new ruling party PCNP was regarded as representing Honam region in the southwestern peninsular. Regionalism has been reinforced by the political dominance of the Youngnam area. Every president from Park Jung Hee in 1963 to Kim Young Sam in 1997 came from Youngnam region. The elite class from the Youngnam regime has formed a ruling power bloc, which has included the military, bureaucracy, party and business for almost 35 years. The elite class from Honam has been excluded from the power bloc and is politically oppressed because Kim Dae Jung, an opposition leader, is from the Honam region and has a strong political base in the that region.
After the old ruling party, the Grand National Party, lost the presidential election in December 1997, it began to coalesce discontent with increasing economic uncertainty of the people in Youngnam area, which was supposed to be the regional electoral base of the Grand National Party. Although the chairman of the party was not born in that area, its party members succeeded to the New Korea Party led by Kim Young Sam who represented politically Youngnam area. The minority ruling party, the People's Congress for the New Politics (PCNP) then tried to convert some congressmen from the majority opposition party and talk them into joining the ruling party in order to expand its seats in the national congress. Such attempts provoked ® erce resistance from the opposition Grand Nation Party, which in turn organized nationwide rallies to protest against political oppression. When the new government came in power, there was a massive reshuf¯ing in the hierarchy of higher bureaucrats that resulted in the reduction of higher bureaucrats born in Youngnam area. Although reducing the number of bureaucrats from Youngnam area seemed to be reasonable because it was over-represented among high of® cials, it was still perceived as a kind of discrimination on the part of the ruling party, which was based in Honam, against bureaucrats from Youngnam.
As the new ruling party pursued economic reform demanded by the IMF, the number of unemployed workers increased rapidly. Since industrial development was concentrated in Youngnam area, people in that area suffered more than other areas during the economic crisis. In the past, they have enjoyed exclusive bene® ts from the state economic policy under the authoritarian regime. When the government imposed the big deal' ± a business swap among major chaebols ± on chaebols' companies in order to reduce over-investment and enhance specialization in production, it caused massive layoffs of employees. For instance, one of the companies that were over-invested was in the auto industry. Because the auto industry was already suffering from overproduction, attempts to enter into the automobile manufacturing industry were not permitted by the state. However, Samsung, the second largest chaebol in Korea, was permitted to produce passenger cars in Pusan of Youngnam province during Kim Young Sam's term of of® ce. Because Samsung Motors was allowed to operate in Kim's political stronghold, the permission of Samsung's entrance into the auto industry was openly considered as favouritism given by Kim Young Sam to Samsung. The ® nancial crisis immediately damaged Samsung Motors, which was in preparation for full operation until 1998. Samsung Motors in Pusan, one of the symbols of over-investment in the car manufacturing sector, was subjected to a merger with Daewoo Motors by state intervention. The state imposed`the big deal', which referred to a business swap among the chaebols. The owner of the Samsung group, Lee Kun Hee, assigned the company to exchange with the owner of Daewoo, Kim Woo Jung. The results of the merger, in fact, would be a mass layoff and a chain reaction bankruptcy of subcontracting companies. The local economy could not escape from such a severe economic slump. During the protest tour in December 1998, the Grand National Party developed in¯ammatory discourses based on regional antagonism:`big deal is a massacre of the people in Youngnam area' and`economic boom in Honam area, economic recession in Youngnam area', etc.
Pusan, as a political base for former president Kim Young Sam, played a symbolic role of aggressive regionalism in the Youngnam area that justi® ed political oppression and the exclusion of political forces from the Honam area. Kim Dae Jung represented these political forces. The Grand National Party considered economic depression and mass layoff to be a new tactic of regionalism used by Kim Dae Jung, who was from the Honam area, to oppress the Youngnam area. Due to the threat of mass layoff, union workers in Pusan joined mass protest rallies against the regional oppression organized by the new ruling party. The conservative Grand National Party and progressive labour unions in Pusan concomitantly shared the view that people in Youngnam were the victims of the economic reform and they should act together. Pervasive discontents among workers contributed to the identi® cation with the old Grand National Party in denouncing the government policy for closing Samsung Motors in Pusan. Thus, the discourse of the crisis was successfully articulated with political regionalism. The emergence of the`new discourse of the crisis' transformed the gestalt of the discourse of the crisis in South Korea in 1998.
The government failed to provide an agenda when it began the reform demanded by the IMF. Although the government could defeat the chaebols' resistance against reform, as the chaebols became a target of criticism both from citizens and from the IMF, it could not prepare for the resistance of workers and citizen themselves. The reform of the chaebol brought about a mass layoff of workers, mainly in the Youngnam area. Kim Dae Jung's government carried out policies to enhance labour market¯exibility, which was one of the key demands of the IMF. Because Kim's government did not have a clear policy to solve mass unemployment, workers began to express their anger. As it became clear that workers were victims of the economic reform, they were beginning to show disenchantment with Kim's economic reform. Criticizing Kim Dae Jung's plan for reforming chaebols as far too radical, the Grand National Party supported the existing chaebol system. Although it did not have any policy alternatives and it changed its policy stance later, it was not so critical of chaebols, because chaebols were its close partners. Later, it began to mobilize disenchantment with the economic reform that developed in industrialized cities in the Youngnam area. In practice, unions that were most critical of chaebols in the past became political allies with the Grand National Party in the Youngnam area. The Grand National Party, with its authoritarian and conservative ideology, would win support even from radical unionists. Discourse of the crisis and reform paved the way for a new twist of the discourse of crisis.
The con¯uence of the authoritarian political party and the progressive unions in the Youngnam area facilitated the crisis of discourse. The opposition Grand National Party succeeded in associating economic reform with regionalism. It implies that the Grand National Party developed an articulation strategy ± a political strategy that the anti-ruling party selectively chose and reinterpreted regionalism in favour of its short-term political purpose. Regionalism again hinders economic restructuring in both private and public sectors. The opposition party utilized fully this articulation strategy to strengthen its political basis after its loss of power for the ® rst time in recent Korean political history. As regionalism emerges as a volatile political agenda, it becomes more dif® cult to dismantle the chaebol system and to carry out progressive economic reform. While the ruling party held a public hearing to investigate the causes of the economic crisis, the opposition party did not participate in that hearing. Rather, it had concentrated on mobilizing anti-government sentiments in its political stronghold. It was the opposition party's strategy to avoid possible political damage because the opposition party, the former ruling party, was responsible for the economic crisis. It was a much safer strategy for the opposition party not to participate in the public hearing, but instead organize a mass rally to coalesce the discontentments of the people in the Youngnam area. Because it recognized the fact that regionalism still functioned as a master code for interpretation of politics and social conditions, it dared to situate economic hardship in regionalism. The meanings of the economic crisis differ from region to region as they differ from class to class.
As the discourse of the crisis proceeded, authoritarian regionalism, as another new development of the political discourse, emerged. It might be a mutation of discourse of economic reform in the¯ux of political struggle and industrial restructuring. The government pursued economic reform to enhance economic rationality in the ® rms. However, the reform is not simply an economic but a social one in the sense that community and family members are affected by the reform. Furthermore, it becomes clear that while the majority of Korean people support the reform, nobody wants to suffer because of it. Although the state emphasizes`the sharing of pains and burden', the sharing is not equally distributed among the population. The discourse of reform failed to be a hegemonic discourse up to now. The rise of the authoritarian regionalism in the Youngnam area severely curtailed the reform drive of the current government.
Unions' dissatisfaction became stronger when the state pursued restructuring of chaebols without any policy for unemployment. The unintended consequence of`the big deal' was the confrontation between the state and labour rather than the state and chaebols. It started in the Youngnam area but spread across the nation. Workers in companies that are subjected to business swapping resisted the reform imposed by the state and demanded guarantees of workers' job security. Chaebols implicitly incited workers' protests by denying job security for workers under business swapping. Two confederations of unions, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and the Korean Federation of Trade Unions (KFTU), threatened to withdraw from the tripartite committee of labour, capital, and the state that was established at the beginning of the new government in 1998. Unions have protested against the state economic policy that was intended to restructure the economy at the expense of workers. The de facto coalition between chaebols and unions was formed and the state became isolated from the political game. Under the condition that economic reform would not guarantee long-term economic security for workers, it was natural that workers would try to escape the immediate uncertainty. Unions did not offer any reform agenda for overcoming the national economic crisis or for guaranteeing workers' job security.
It is obvious that the Korean economy should be restructured in order to overcome the current economic crisis. Reform became the Zeitgeist in the late 1990s in South Korea, but the discourses of the reform changed the concerns of the people from`what to reform' to`reform for whom.' The state's crisis management failed to form a popular consensus on how and what to reform and for whom because it was rooted in neo-liberal economic ideology. Furthermore, economic reform for the nation did not become a hegemonic discourse among the Koreans simply because economic reform became a subject of party contention, and demands from the mass unemployed workers and the poor were ignored. Economic discourses, in turn, generated the crisis of discourse because of the conservative institutional politics concerned with power mongering.
Conclusions
The economic crisis transposed the discursive formation in South Korea, discrediting the old discursive resources such as internationalization and globalization in the public sphere. Internationalization and globalization, which were discussed all over newspapers, television screens, and academic symposia for many years, suddenly disappeared from the public discourse. Instead, IMF and the economic crisis become the master code of discourse in both private and pubic sectors. Con¯icting discourses were developed, re¯ecting the already structured political ideology and divergent economic interests, but the political dynamics accelerated by the change of regimes after the presidential election contributed to the shifting subject of the crisis discourse. The old ruling party that monopolized political power for 35 years tried to maintain its organization and in¯uence while the new ruling party attempted to destabilize it. The old ruling party succeeded in articulating regionalism with political resistance against the ruling party during the economic reform triggered by the IMF bailout package. It replaced the main subject of political discourse with regionalism associated with regional oppression and exclusion in the Youngnam area.
This analysis illustrates that the discourse of the economic crisis is neither purely an economic phenomenon nor purely a discursive phenomenon. Already formed ideological space and the new political conjuncture shape the discourse of the economic crisis, limiting discursive resource and affecting the ef® cacy of discourses. Political regionalism, which developed during the last three decades, is still exerting a strong in¯uence on the discourse on the economic crisis and the process of economic reform. As the political actors articulated regionalism with the political critique of the other political actors, economic reform based on economic rationality became the subject of political contention. Thus, political rationality, narrowly de® ned as a means to an end, inevitably intervened in the process of economic reform.
Discourses of crisis also reveal a crisis of academic discourse in that the existing explanatory frameworks of the economic transformation fail to understand the sudden collapse of the Korean economy. We also observe that the political discourse on the economic crisis is in crisis, in that all the crisis discourses fail to gain hegemonic status. The combination of minority status of the ruling party and challenges from the opposition majority party, the chaebols and labour unions has made the politics of reform fragile. It demonstrated the emptiness of the political slogan of`sharing pains and burdens.' Ironically, some labour unions that challenged the rule of the chaebols and the old regime were taking the same stance with the chaebols and the conservative opposition party against the state reform policy. Workers' concerns for job security and capitalists' concerns for maintaining ownership converged to resist the business swap enforced by the state. Nevertheless, antagonism between labour unions and chaebols has deepened because chaebols denied workers' demand for job security. Chaebols strongly wanted to enhancē exibility in the labour market and maintain their ownership structure and management style at the same time. Regionalism developed under the authoritarian regime provided a political basis for convergence of antagonistic interests among chaebols, the old ruling party and radical workers in the Youngnam area. The crisis of discourse of the crisis is an outcome of the conjuncture of the regime change and the economic crisis that intensi® ed contentious politics in South Korea.
Meanwhile, intensi® cation of regionalism makes incipient democracy dangerous, since it hinders the development of party politics that deals with issues beyond region and family. Political parties become unnecessary for dealing with policies, as top political leaders appeal to regional hostility. Authoritarian regionalism haunts the southern part of the Korean peninsular and wields immense in¯uence on the discourse of the crisis and reform. Authoritarian regionalism suffocates any progressive discourses ± feminism, socialism, environmentalism, human rights, participatory democracy, etc ± that have already been weakened by the economic crisis.
The economic crisis in Korea was the cataclysm that broke the crust of the authoritarian regime and the chaebols. Coming from a pre-existing political discourse, the discourse of the crisis became the discursive warfare tainted with ideologies and the old politics rooted in regionalism. Each political force tried to maximize its own political in¯uence without providing feasible discourses on crisis management. This resulted in a genuine crisis of discourse that facilitated mass anger toward institutionalized party politics as the economic deterioration of the mass became a dramatic reality in Korea. Mass anger became a platform for the successful political civic movement that was aiming to clean up power mongering politicians in the general election on 13 April 2000.
Notes
1. According to the IMF, the cause of the Korean economic crisis was quite simple and the measures for curing the economy were also simple. The major cause of the crisis was lack of foreign currency due to market distortion in the economy. The measures demanded by the IMF included reform of the banking system and corporate governance, liberalizatio n of trade and capital market, increase of¯exibility of the labour market, etc. 2. Kim Dae Jung and Lee Hoi Change received 40.3 percent and 38.7 percent of the total vote respectively. Kim could not win the presidential elections four times. In 1997, he made an electoral coalition with Kim Jong Phil, who was a former Prime Minister of the Park Chung Hee regime and a political foe of Kim Dae Jung for two decades. Furthermore, Lee In Je, who did not accept the outcome of the congress of the ruling party for selecting the candidate for the presidential election, ran as the third candidate. Lee received 19.2 percent of the vote and contributed to the victory of Kim Dae Jung. The split of the presidential candidates of the ruling party and the coalition of the opposition party contributed to the winning of Kim Dae Jung. Eventually, the odd coalition between Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Phil broke down after two years, in February 2000. 3. Due to too frequent reshuf¯ing, the average of duration of political parties was less than 4 years for half a century. In the late 1990s, the old ruling New Korea Party merged with the small opposition Democratic Party into the Grand National Party. 4. When Hanbo Steel Company was on the brink of bankruptcy in January 1997, its total debt was almost 5,700 billion won. It was impossible for the company, with a capital of 90 billion won, to borrow such an astronomical amount of money from banks without political intervention at the highest level in the loan decision-making of the banks. Thus, the case of Hanbo Steel Company revealed the nexus of top politicians and Hanbo Steel Company was called`the Hanbo scandal'. Opposition parties insisted that Kim Hyun Chul, the second son of the president Kim Young Sam, was involved in that scandal (Weekly Hankook 6 February 1997).
